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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TONY PEREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950333-CA 
NATURE OF APPEAL AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
A jury convicted defendant of theft by receiving stolen property, a second-
degree felony, and driving while unlicensed, a class C misdemeanor (R. 129, 
130). Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995), this Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUES AND REVIEW STANDARDS 
1. Whether the evidence that defendant did not have a driver's license 
is so "inconclusive or so inherently improbable" that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt? In evaluating an insufficiency of the evidence 
claim, this Court looks at the evidence to determine whether it is so inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that it could not support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 19QT) In this 
case, the State concedes that the record evidence is insufficient to support 
defendant's misdemeanor conviction for driving while unlicensed. 
2. When the trial court sustained some objections to defendant's 
testimony on hearsay grounds, but the testimony nevertheless came in without 
objection later, was the trial court's conduct prejudicial, even if erroneous? 
Whether testimony is inadmissible hearsay is a conclusion of law, which this 
Court reviews for correctness. State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993). 
An error is harmless if it is "sufficiently inconsequential that [the appellate court 
can] conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993). 
3. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury regarding "possession of 
property recently stolen" consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
in State v. Asay. 631 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1981). This Court reviews jury 
instructions via a correction of error standard. State v. Brooks. 833 P.2d 362, 
363 (Utah App. 1992). 
4. Whether the defendant has established a sufficient number of errors 
in the trial that, "standing alone [are not] severe enough to warrant a new trial, 
but when considered together . . . denied the defendant a fair trial." State v. 
Young. 853 P.2d 327, 367 (Utah 1993). This doctrine does not entail a precise 
2 
standard of review. If cumulative error exists, it depends on finding numerous 
individual errors, each of which may have different standard of review. QL State 
v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993); State v. St.Clair. 282 P.2d 323 
(Utah 1955); Gooden v. State. 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okla.Crim.App. 1980). 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-202 (Supp. 1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1995) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
A jury convicted defendant of "theft by receiving stolen property," a 
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and of 
driving while unlicensed, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53-3-202 (Supp. 1995) (R. 119-20). As a result of these convictions, the trial 
court sentenced defendant to a three-month sentence for the misdemeanor and a 
one-to-fifteen year sentence for the second-degree felony (R. 129-30). The 
sentences will be served concurrently at the Utah State Prison (id.). 
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Statement of Facts 
At 6:30 in the morning on February 4, 1995, Bennie Gonzales left his 
home to start up his 1993 red Chevrolet Cavalier (R. 199). He left the car 
outside his garage so it could warm up and went back inside to get ready for 
work (isL). About ten minutes later, he walked out of his house, found his car 
was gone, and saw broken glass on the driveway (R. 200). Mr. Gonzales 
promptly reported the theft to the police fid.). 
At approximately 2:00 that afternoon, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Kathy 
Slagowski was driving her marked police car southbound on 1-15 when she saw a 
red Chevrolet Cavalier passing by her at a slightly higher rate of speed (R. 206). 
When she looked at the car, she thought she saw the passenger light up what 
looked like a marijuana cigarette (R. 207). Trooper Slagowski positioned herself 
behind the car, which pulled over to the emergency lane abruptly, even before 
she had fully turned on her emergency lights (R. 207). Because she was 
primarily concerned with the possible marijuana, she approached the passenger 
side and asked the passenger, Jose Al Cantor1, to hand over the marijuana2 (R. 
1
 This name is spelled in different ways in the record and transcript. In the 
transcript, "AT is not capitalized, but is capitalized in the written documents. Except for 
direct quotes from the transcript, which use the lower case, the State will capitalize the name. 
2
 No marijuana was ever, in fact, found and it was not a part of this trial. 
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212). While looking in the car, she noticed an open beer bottle in the front 
passenger side and one of the passengers in the back seat "slipping his hands in 
his pockets" in a nervous manner (R. 214). 
Despite her request, no one was able to produce identification (isL). 
According to the trooper, "[t]he driver [the defendant] told me he didn't have his 
driver's license with him, or didn't have one, I don't recall" (HL). Trooper 
Slagowski asked the three individuals to stand by the guard rail while she radioed 
for backup (idL). 
While she was calling for backup, defendant and his passengers bolted 
from the guard rail and ran across the six-lane freeway (R. 215). Trooper 
Slagowski informed the dispatch office of the escape and two officers responded 
(R. 216). The police eventually found defendant and his cohorts hiding in a tire 
warehouse at approximately 4600 South and 150 West (R. 262). After his 
apprehension, defendant gave conflicting stories to the police. First, he told 
Trooper Dan Ferguson that he did not know the car was stolen because Al Cantor 
had picked him up and that he ran because he "thought Jose must have had drugs 
or guns" (R. 249-50). Defendant also initially told Trooper Ferguson that Al 
Cantor was driving, but after Trooper Ferguson confronted him with Trooper 
Slagowski's contrary claim, defendant admitted he was driving (R. 251). 
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Defendant also initially told Trooper Mike Cowdell that Al Cantor picked 
him up in the car, but only 20 minutes later changed his story to say that they had 
asked to borrow the car from the owner (R. 263). Even though the purported 
owner told defendant "No, you can't take the car, because you can't drive," 
defendant admitted that he and his friends took it anyway (i$L). Defendant never 
told Trooper Cowdell that he was driving only because Al Cantor was drunk (R. 
272). Defendant did not tell Trooper Ferguson that he took over driving from Al 
Cantor because Al Cantor was drunk, which was defendant's version at trial (R. 
258 (Trooper's testimony) 293-94 (defendant's testimony)). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State concedes that the evidence regarding driving without a license is 
legally insufficient to support his conviction for driving while unlicensed. 
Therefore the class C misdemeanor should be vacated. Although a jury's verdict 
is accorded great deference, the evidence here simply was too insignificant for 
the inference of guilt to logically follow. The trooper's statement that she could 
not recall whether defendant told her he did not have a license or did not have it 
with him is inconclusive because both possibilities have a fifty percent chance of 
being correct. The defendant's second statement that his friend would not him 
6 
borrow the car because he could not drive, does not sufficiently add to that 
evidence. 
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred when it sustained the State's 
hearsay objections to certain questions and answers defendant gave during direct 
examination. Defendant concedes, however, that the testimony eventually came 
in without objection; thus, defendant was able to present the evidence to the jury. 
Thus, since the jury actually had all the evidence before it, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that, but for the trial court's conduct, a more favorable result would 
have occurred. 
The defendant's challenge to jury instruction 19 is mistaken because it 
erroneously interprets its primary legal authority. The substance of the jury 
instruction on "possession of property recently stolen" reflected exactly language 
the Utah Supreme Court has previously approved, avoiding mandatory language 
or the creation of an impermissible inference. 
Finally, defendant's reliance on the cumulative error doctrine is 
fundamentally incorrect. This doctrine relies on the existence of more than one 
error in the trial proceeding. Here, there were no errors in the evidence 
regarding the theft by receiving count; even if the hearsay objections were 
improper, they were harmless errors and did not prejudice defendant's case. 
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Also, the error in convicting defendant of driving while unlicensed should not be 
considered an "error" for purposes of defendant's conviction of theft by 
receiving. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE CONCEDES THAT THE EVIDENCE 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S DRIVING WHILE 
UNLICENSED WAS INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE IT 
WAS INHERENTLY CONTRADICTORY AND 
INCONCLUSIVE; THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S 
THREE-MONTH SENTENCE FOR THE CLASS C 
MISDEMEANOR SHOULD BE VACATED. 
Defendant alleges that the State's evidence of his driving while unlicensed 
is insufficient to support the guilty verdict. Brief of Defendant at 8-11. This 
Court reviews insufficiency claims with a jaundiced eye, since the jury is 
normally the final arbiter of the evidence. State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 
(Utah 1993). However, in unusual circumstances, a jury convicts a defendant 
based on evidence that is "so inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could 
not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." LL When this 
happens, this Court should nullify the verdict and reverse the judgment. LL 
The State produced two statements that formed the basis for the verdict of, 
guilt for driving while unlicensed. While questioning the people in the car, 
Trooper Slagowski asked for identification (R. 214). Although none of the 
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individuals had identification, Trooper Slagowski told of the following specific 
exchange with defendant, who was driving: "The driver told me he didn't have 
his driver's license with him, or didn't have one, I don't recall" (MJ. The 
second statement also came from defendant, as recounted by Trooper Cowdell, 
when he was explaining why his "friend" would not let him borrow the car: "He 
[the defendant] said that this friend said, "No, you can't take the car, because 
you can't drive"3 (R. 263). 
Trooper Slagowski's admission that she did not recall whether defendant 
said "he did not have a license" or "did not have a license with him" establishes 
two distinct, and equally possible, alternatives: either defendant said he did not 
have a license, in which case, he would be guilty of the charged crime, or he said 
he merely did not have the license with him, in which case he would not be 
guilty. The use of the "or" affords the incriminating statement only a fifty 
percent chance of being the correct one. Without more, two reasonable 
alternative hypotheses do not equal proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."4 Because 
3
 Defendant denied making this comment (R. 303). 
4
 The State does not intimate that two opposing statements necessarily present 
reasonable alternative hypotheses. The jury has a right to believe, based on other 
circumstances, such as credibility of the witnesses, that one of the statements was true beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Here, no such possibility exists because the statements came from the 
same witness and the record provides no record that lends more credence to one version than 
the other. 
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of the presence of an equally possible alternative, the "inference of guilt does not 
logically flow." Workman. 852 P.2d at 987. This concept was best expressed in 
a jury instruction the Utah Supreme Court discussed in State v. King. 604 P.2d 
923, 926 (Utah 1979): 
To warrant you in convicting the defendant, the 
evidence must to your minds exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the defendant. 
That is to say, if after an entire consideration and 
comparison of all the testimony in the case you can 
reasonably explain the facts given in evidence on any 
reasonable ground other than the guilt of the defendant, 
you should acquit him. 
The second statement, told by Trooper Cowdell, does not bridge this 
inferential gap. It consists of defendant's assertion that his friend reminded him 
"you can't take the car because you can't drive" (R. 263). Though potentially 
supportive of the inference that defendant was unlicensed, this statement also 
supports other, equally valid inferences, i.e., that defendant cannot drive because 
his insurance has expired or an evaluative judgment that defendant is not a good 
driver or is intoxicated, or that defendant could not drive because he did not have 
his license with him. Again, while the State's hypothesis is not foreclosed by this 
statement, the inference of guilt does not logically flow from it, even when added 
to the first statement. Therefore, the evidence was too inconclusive to support 
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the guilty verdict to the misdemeanor driving while unlicensed charge, which, 
therefore, should be vacated. 
H. ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
SUSTAINED THE STATE'S HEARSAY 
OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS DEFENDANT GAVE, DEFENDANT 
WAS ABLE TO PRESENT THE INFORMATION 
TO THE JURY LATER WHEN THE HEARSAY 
PROBLEM WAS AVOIDED; THEREFORE, THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ACTIONS DID NOT 
PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
Defendant's theory was that the passenger, Jose Al Cantor, stole the car, 
picked up defendant, and failed to tell him that the car was stolen until the 
incident at the guard rail with Trooper Slagowski (R. 330-338). Defendant 
claims that the trial court's sustaining objections to several questions and answers 
prevented him from fully developing this theory. Brief of Defendant at 13. He 
specifically challenges the trial court's actions during the following four 
colloquies. 
Q [by defense counsel] Okay, who was driving? 
A [by defendant] I didn't know at first. He called me over the 
car, he said, "Tony, Tony." 
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MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor, 
hearsay. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained as to what 
he said. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Okay, We're not offering 
that for the truth of the matter asserted; just to 
explain his actions. 
THE COURT: I don't know where it's going. Sol 
haven't heard what he has said, nor do I know what 
you're offering it for. But the objection is sustained. 
Objection to hearsay. 
(R. 289). 
Q [by defense counsel] Did he represent that the car was his? 
A [defendant] Yeah, he did. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Objection is sustained. 
MS. BYRNE: Hearsay. 
THE COURT: It's sustained and stricken. 
Q [by Mr. Youngberg] Did he have the keys to the car? 
12 
A [defendant] He did have the keys. 
Q Did he give you any reason to think it was stolen? 
A None at all. He told me he bought the car. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained, Mr. Perez, don't tell us 
what anybody else said. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
(R. 292). 
Q [by defense counsel] And why did you flee from the scene? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe 
this is going to call for a statement by the other 
individual, however, we're not offering that to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted, simply to 
explain his actions in fleeing. 
THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard an objection as 
to what — are you going to make one? 
MS. BYRNE: May we approach the bench, Your 
Honor? 
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of the jury) 
13 
Q[by defense counsel] So there came a time when you took 
off, right? 
A [defendant] Yeah. 
Q All right. Without going into what anybody told you, 
did somebody say something that made you run? 
A Yeah. 
(R. 297-98) 
Q So why did you run, Tony? 
A Because he told me the car was stolen. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
(R. 299). 
Defendant's apparent objective in these colloquies was to get across to the 
jury the idea that defendant was under the reasonable impression that the car 
belonged to Al Cantor. Whatever the merits of defendant's goal, the objected-to 
questions and answers did ask for or give inadmissible hearsay. Nevertheless, as 
defendant concedes in his brief, the "testimony he sought to elicit made it into the 
record." Brief of Defendant at 14. Defendant and his attorney had this 
exchange. 
14 
Q So the bottom line is you ran because why, you 
were scared? 
A No, because the car was stolen. 
Q When did you find out the car was stolen? 
A When they took us to the side of the road. 
Q And how did you find out the car was stolen? 
A From Mr. al Cantor. 
Q Up to that point did you know that the car was 
stolen? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any - In your mind did you have any 
reason to think that [the] car was stolen? 
A No.5 
(R. 299). These answers gave the jury the full flavor of the information 
defendant tried to get out in the previous conversations, but that were stricken on 
objection. Due to this final colloquy, the critical inquiry becomes whether the 
defendant was harmed. To determine whether a potential error justifies reversal, 
5
 Comparing this unobjected-to exchange to the earlier colloquies best illustrates 
the hearsay problems. Throughout the earlier discussions, defendant restated the words 
uttered by Al Cantor. In this exchange, however, the defendant only recollected the substance 
of the information that caused him to run and to believe the car was not stolen, not Al Cantor's 
precise words. 
15 
a reviewing court looks at all the evidence to determine if, absent the error, there 
was a "reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result." State v. Dunn. 850 
P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993); State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 
1987). In Knight, the Utah Supreme Court gave more definition to the term 
"reasonable likelihood" by tying it to an "erosion of confidence" standard. 
Knight. 734 P.2d at 920. In other words, the evidence allegedly omitted would 
have to be so important that its absence erodes confidence in the verdict. 
However, the evidence did, in fact, come in through other questioning; 
therefore, defendant's fails to show a reasonable likelihood of a different verdict. 
The evidence defendant wanted to bring in, i.e., that he did not know the car was 
stolen, was not omitted as a result of the trial court's hearsay rulings. He was 
allowed to testify that he fled the scene because he heard from Al Cantor that the 
car was stolen (R. 299). This was the essence of defendant's theory. To succeed 
in his challenge, defendant would have to show that the manner by which it 
eventually came in did not "cure" the previous defects. This defendant tries to 
do, but his appellate claim that the jury must have disregarded the testimony 
because of the court's previous rulings is mere speculation. When looked at in 
the overall context of the trial, this case becomes similar to State v. Butler. 560 
P.2d 1136, 1140 (Utah 1977) (Hall J., concurring), in which Justice Hall pointed 
16 
out that, because the court eventually allowed defendant to make a statement that 
had previously been stricken on hearsay grounds, "the prior ruling prohibiting it, 
if error at all, was harmless error, (emphasis in original). 
m . JURY INSTRUCTION 19 DOES NOT MIRROR 
THE LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
402(1) (1995) AND DOES NOT CREATE AN 
IMPERMISSIBLE PRESUMPTION; THEREFORE, 
THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT ERRONEOUS. 
Defendant challenges jury instruction 19, which informed the jury that 
possession of recently-stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, might allow 
it to infer that the person "in possession of the stolen property stole the property 
and knew that the property was stolen" (R. 98). Defendant claims that this 
I 
instruction violated the presumption of innocence and was specifically prohibited 
in State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d 321, 327 (Utah 1985). However, defendant 
reads too much into Chambers by failing to recognize the important differences 
between this instruction and the one prohibited in Chambers. A side-by-side 
comparison of the instructions illustrates the distinction and shows why jury 
instruction 19 was properly given. 
Jury Instruction 19 Chambers instruction 
Possession of property recently Possession of property recently 
stolen, if not satisfactorily explained, stolen, when no satisfactory 
is ordinarily a circumstances from explanation of such possession is 
17 
which you may reasonably draw the 
inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by 
the evidence in the case, that the 
person in possession of the stolen 
property stole the property and knew 
that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt (1) that the defendant was in 
possession of property, (2) that the 
property was stolen, (3) that such 
possession was not too remote in 
point of time from the theft, and (4) 
that no satisfactory explanation of 
such possession has been given or 
appears from the evidence, then you 
may infer from those facts and find 
that the defendant stole the property 
and knew the property was stolen. 
(R. 98). 
Jury instruction 19 differs significantly from the Chambers instruction in 
two vital particulars. First, jury instruction 19 is permissive, constantly using the 
word "may"; whereas the instruction in Chambers uses the word shall. The 
Chambers instruction also made possession "prima facie" evidence, in line with 
the statutory presumption in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1) (1995)6. It was the 
6
 "Possession of property recently stolen when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property." 
18 
made, shall be deemed prima facie 
evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property. 
Chambers. 709 P.2d at 324. 
directory nature of the instruction and the term "prima facie" that drew the 
Chamber court's ire. fcL at 326-27. 
Further, the Chambers court did not entirely prohibit the use of an 
appropriate instruction, as its discussion of State v. Asay. 631 P.2d 861, 864 
(Utah 1981) indicates. The Chambers court drew upon Asay to distinguish the 
correct and incorrect types of jury instructions in stolen property cases. Whereas 
the Chambers instruction failed because it used mandatory language and the term 
"prima facie," the instruction given in Asay survived because it did not include 
that prohibited term and used permissive language: "You are further instructed 
that one who is found to be in possession of property recently stolen, may be 
found to be the guilty person unless he gives a satisfactory explanation of his 
possession thereof." Asay, 631 P.2d at 863. Instruction 19 tracks the permissive 
language of Asay. 
Thus, contrary to defendant's claim that the Chambers court prohibited 
trial courts from giving any jury instruction relating to stolen property, Chambers 
only prohibits instructions identical to the statutory language, i.e., using the 
"shall" and "prima facie" standard. In Chambers, the Court stated that in Asay 
it "upheld an instruction which, unlike the instant case, did not use the statutory 
language." Chambers. 709 P.2d at 326. The Court made the same distinction in 
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State v. Smith. 726 P.2d 1232, 1234-36 (Utah 1986). In Smith, the trial court 
had given an instruction that paralleled the statutory language with one important 
change: the court made clear that it "meant only that (/"the jury found certain 
facts that 'you may infer from those facts that the defendant committed the 
theft."' 726 P.2d at 1234 (emphasis added). The supreme court upheld the 
instruction because the trial court clarified the meaning of the statutory language 
in a way that avoided the Chambers problem. LL 
Jury instruction 19 is permissive and does not use the prohibited statutory 
language. It directs the jury to look at all the evidence and circumstances before 
inferring, merely by the fact of defendant's possession, that he stole the property 
or knew it was stolen. In substance, jury instruction 19 is nearly identical to the 
approved instruction given in Asay and is devoid of the prohibited statutory 
language used in Chambers. For this reason, the instruction was proper. 
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IV. BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE ERROR 
DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE ONLY WHEN 
THERE IS MORE THAN ONE ERROR, IT DOES 
NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE AND DEFENDANT'S 
FELONY CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE 
REVERSED ON THAT GROUND. 
By definition, the "cumulative error'' doctrine is a remedy designed to cure 
more than one error, none of which singly warrant reversal but together 
undermine the court's confidence that a fair trial occurred. State v. Dunn. 850 
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). This doctrine is inapplicable here because the 
only error is the conviction for driving while unlicensed, which should not be 
considered as an "error'' for purposes of the separate theft count. Even if the 
Court finds additional error, in the striking of the allegedly hearsay comments, it 
was not prejudicial. Compared to State v. St. Clair. 282 P.2d 323, 332 (Utah 
1955), where the Court found "numerous irregularities'' to justify reversal via the 
cumulative error doctrine, this case actually presents no irregularities prejudicial 
to the result.7 
Defendant presents a quandary for himself by alleging the prosecutor's closing 
argument was improper. As admitted, defendant's trial counsel did not object to these 
comments. Brief of Defendant at 24, n.3. His refusal to object probably stemmed from his 
recognition that prosecutors, and defense counsel, have wide latitude to discuss the "evidence 
and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom." State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 
(Utah 1989). If defendant believes trial counsel's failure to object was incorrect, then the 
proper analytical framework is ineffective assistance of counsel, which he has not alleged on 
appeal. Without such a claim, unpreserved error cannot serve as a predicate for cumulative 
error. 
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Thus, the cumulative doctrine does not apply here and is not a correct basis for 
reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for driving while unlicensed should be vacated; his 
conviction for theft by receiving should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
The State does not believe oral argument would enhance the Court's 
decision making process because the facts and legal precepts are straightforward 
and adequately presented in the briefs. Additionally, the State does not believe 
publication would significantly further the development of the law or aid courts 
or practitioners. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS day of iJebHiaFy" 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
1 
53-3-202. Drivers must be licensed - Taxicab endorsement. 
(1) A person may not drive a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person is: 
(a) licensed as a driver by the division under this chapter; 
(b) driving an official United States Government class D motor vehicle with a valid United 
States Government driver permit or license for that type of vehicle; 
(c) driving a road roller, road machinery, or any farm tractor or implement of husbandry 
temporarily drawn, moved, or propelled on the highways; 
(d) a nonresident who is at least 16 years of age and younger than 18 years of age who has in 
his immediate possession a valid license certificate issued to him in his home state or country 
and is driving as a class D or M driver; 
(e) a nonresident who is at least 18 years of age and who has in his immediate possession a 
valid license certificate issued to him in his home state or country if driving in the class or 
classes identified on the home state license certificate, except those persons referred to in Part 6 
of this chapter; 
(f) driving under a temporary learner permit, instruction permit, or practice permit in 
accordance with Section 53-3-210 or 53A-13-208; 
(g) driving with a temporary license certificate issued in accordance with Section 53-3-207; 
or 
(h) exempt under Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-highway Vehicles. 
(2) A person may not drive or, while within the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, 
exercise any degree or form of physical control of a motor vehicle being towed by a motor 
vehicle upon a highway unless the person: 
(a) holds a valid license issued under this chapter for the type or class of motor vehicle being 
towed; or 
(b) is exempted under either Subsection (l)(b) or (l)(c). 
(3) A person may not drive a motor vehicle as a taxicab on a highway of this state unless the 
person has a taxicab endorsement issued by the division on his license certificate. 
(c) 1953-1996 by The Michic Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
1 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the 
property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the property or service 
stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an 
interest in property for purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the 
property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly believing that the 
owner, if present, would have consented. 
(c) 1953-1996 by The Michic Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
1 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property - Duties of pawnbrokers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, 
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the owner, 
knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case of an actor 
who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense 
charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, acquires it for a 
consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or person who has or 
operates a business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, 
or obtains property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next to 
his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used 
or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or representative of 
a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be 
presumed to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the defendant 
was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a 
pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the property 
without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then the burden shall be upon 
the defendant to show that the property bought, received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as defined in 
Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of the 
property; 
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
(c) 1953-1996 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that 
the 'person in possession of the stolen property stole the 
property and knew that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt faj) that the defendant was in possession of property, (uh 
that the property was stolen, (T^p that such possession was not 
too remote in point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or 
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts 
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the 
property was stolen. 
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